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1959] TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 341
defendant, in the course of a broadcast, made the following
statement concerning plaintiff:
"Cazan tells you he wants to bring factories here - tex-
tile mills, milk process, feed mills, etc. Why there was one
textile mill that was coming here and about to be started in
Mamou four or five years ago. This same Cazan is respon-
sible for its not coming here. It is his fault that it did not
come."
The court overruled an exception of no cause of action to a




The Supreme Court had occasion again to affirm the well-
settled proposition that an employee whose duties require that
he operate, ride in, or be in the vicinity of the operation of a
motor propelled conveyance of any kind is engaged in a hazard-
ous employment and is covered by the compensation statute even
though he is doing non-hazardous work at the time of the ac-
cident.' In Luce v. New Hotel Monteleone, Inc. 2 claimant, a
supervisor of domestic help in defendant's hotel, was obliged to
travel from floor to floor on an elevator. She was injured while
alighting therefrom. Compensation was properly awarded. It is
perhaps significant that the opinion by Justice Hamiter appears
to emphasize that the employee must be "regularly exposed to
or... frequently brought in contact with the hazardous feature
of the business." The fact that the above-quoted portion is
italicized in the opinion may suggest that perhaps the much-
disputed rule in the Brownfield decision 3 is not yet a dead letter
in Louisiana compensation law.
Although farming, normally a non-hazardous occupation,
may be rendered hazardous through the use of trucks, tractors,
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Byas v. Hotel Bentley, 157 La. 1030, 103 So. 303 (1924). MALONE, Louisi-
ANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 101 (1951).
2. 234 La. 1075, 102 So.2d 461 (1958).
3. Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., 196 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940).
MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE 129-131,
1101 (1951).
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or other mechanized equipment, yet in such case it is essential
that such plaintiff show at least that his duties required that he
use or be in the vicinity of the use of such equipment. Following
this well-established principle, a tenant farmer who at no time
was required to use such a device or machine was denied com-
pensation in the case, Fontenot v. Fontenot.4 Claimant was in-
jured while splitting posts. The fact that he used his employer's
automobile on an occasional whiskey purchasing errand and
that after his accident he used a tractor on a piece of land that
he intended to cultivate for himself was not enough to bring him
within the terms of the statute.
PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY TO EMPLOYEE OF CONTRACTOR
In view of the fact that a purchaser of timber is not subject
to compensation liability to the employees of the seller, there
has developed a familiar practice in the lumbering industry of
interjecting a middleman between the ultimate buyer and the
owner of the standing timber. This person fills the ostensible
role of one who purchases from the owner and resells to the
ultimate buyer. In practice he frequently is a mere contractor
who severs the timber and delivers it to the real buyer. As such,
his employees should be entitled to compensation from the buyer
under R.S. 23:1061. But the fact that he can be technically
classified as a purchaser for resale has served for many years
in the past to immunize his principal from liability.5 Happily
there is increasing evidence that the attitude of our Supreme
Court toward this situation is undergoing a substantial change.6
The latest instance is Stevens v. Mitchell,7 decided during the
last term. One Tullos negotiated with Griffin for the purchase
6f standing trees. The sale was effected through Mitchell, who
had an exclusive resale agreement with Tullos. In this case pay-
ments to Griffin were actually made by Mitchell (presumably
with money furnished by Tullos). Stevens, one of Mitchell's
workers, was killed and his widow secured compensation from
Tullos under R.S. 23:1061. Despite the defendant's claim that
Mitchell was a seller, the court emphasized that he was obliged
to deliver the logs to Tullos' mill and that all arrangements had
4. 234 La. 480, 100 So.2d 477 (1958).
5. Taylor v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 220 La, 995, 58 So.2d 206
(1952).
6. See, for example, Jones v. Hennessy, 232 La. 786, 95 So.2d 312 (1957),
discussed in 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVEw 71 (1957).
7. 234 La. 977, 102 So.2d 237 (1958).
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to meet with the approval of Tullos. These features, however,
have been present in several situations previously litigated in
which the courts have nevertheless approved the transaction as
a bona fide sale and have denied compensation."
One new feature of Stevens v. Mitchell, however, must have
impressed the court and may even have been partly responsible
for the decision that Mitchell was a contractor. Mitchell, anxious
to protect his own workers, had paid compensation premiums
to Tullos, who expressly undertook to procure insurance pro-
tection for Mitchell, but he then neglected to do so. This same
picture was before the court of appeal last year in Carpenter v.
Madden.9 In that case the court sustained the claim that there
was a buyer-seller relationship, but it nevertheless imposed per-
sonal liability on the "buyer" by holding that he was estopped
to deny that he had procured no insurance protection for the
seller's workers. This approach led to the conclusion that the
buyer Was liable for compensation but that his own compensa-
tion insurer was not subject to liability. But in Stevens v. Mit-
chell the Supreme Court, by finding the relationship to be that
of principal and contractor, was able to reach the insurer, whose
public liability extended to all Tullos' operations. The fact that
the premiums paid by Mitchell did not reach the hands of the
insurer was not important. This was through no fault of either
Mitchell or the claimants.
Tullos and his insurer then insisted that since Tullos was a
principal he was entitled to reimbursement from Mitchell, his
contractor, for the compensation that Tullos was obliged to pay
the claimant. Technically this would be true under R.S. 23:1061.10
However, the purpose of this entire section is to place pressure
upon the principal so that he will require that his contractor
insure against compensation liability for the benefit of the
worker. An application of the indemnity principle to the present
facts would permit Tullos to recover judgment against Mitchell
on a claim that exists solely because of Tullos' neglect. Although
the court, in denying Tullos' claim, did not expressly state that
8. See, for example, the following cases where the intermediary agreed to resell
exclusively to defendant and the transaction was neverthless regarded as a bona
fide sale: Hatch v. Industrial Lbr. Co., 199 So. 587 (La. App. 1st Cir 1941);
Perkins v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards, Inc., 199 So. 590 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
In the Hatch case all arrangements were made by defendant.
9. 90 So.2d 508 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956), certiorari denied, (1957).




the latter was estopped to claim indemnity, yet the application
of an estoppel is clear. Furthermore, on familiar tort principles,
Mitchell could appropriately have claimed a return of any in-
demnity that might have been exacted of him. Tullos' neglect
was directly responsible for the loss.
DISABILITY
Although the provisions in the statute for specific losses are
not applicable where the victim is totally or partially disabled,"
yet occasional situations reach the appellate courts where there
is a specific loss with no resulting disability of any kind. Such
were the facts in Hall v. Pipeline Service Corporation.12 Plain-
tiff suffered an injury to the Achilles tendon which was re-
paired by an operation. About three and one-half months later
the defendant's physician pronounced him able to return to work.
He did not do so, however, and instituted a claim for total dis-
ability alleging that he suffered a residual osteoporosis. There
being no working experience upon which the court could rely in
order to determine whether or not disability existed, it was
obliged to resort to medical testimony, which involved the usual
conflict of expert opinion. The court concluded that no disability
existed and awarded compensation under R.S. 23:1221, the pro-
visions for specific disability. It averaged the medical estimates
of the loss of function of the use of the foot and arrived at the
figure of 17.5%. The significant part of the holding is that
compensation was based upon 17.5% of the full 65% of wages,
rather than upon 65% of thirty-five dollars (the maximum al-
lowable weekly payment that could be made for loss of the entire
foot).
In Reed v. Calcasieu Paper Company" the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the oft-asserted proposition that a manual worker
will not be compelled to labor in pain, and that where the situa-
tion is thus he is entitled to an award of compensation for total
permanent disability. 14 The court further held that where a
manual laborer, injured on the job, had submitted to a hernio-
plasty and complications ensued from the operation resulting
in pain and suffering that he would not be obliged to submit
11. McGruder v. Service Drayage Co., 183 La. 75, 162 So. 806 (1935). MAYER,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW IN LOUISIANA 85-97 (1937).
12. 233 La. 821, 98 So.2d 202 (1957).
13. 233 La. 747, 98 So.2d 175 (1957).
14. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
1247 (1951).
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to a second operation which would probably entail the amputa-
tion of his right testicle and a portion of his right spermatic
cord on the mere assertion of the defendant's surgeon that the
pain suffered could possibly be removed by such operation.
Modification of Award for Disability
R.S. 23:1331 provides in substance that a compensation judg-
ment may at the request of either party be modified at any time
six months after its rendition on the ground that the condition
of the plaintiff has subsequently diminished or increased. Com-
pensation claimants seldom resort to this provision because the
usual judgment for compensation for disability directs the pay-
ment for the full period of disability, not exceeding the maximum
number of weeks provided by the statute. Employers, however,
not infrequently apply for a modification on the ground that
the disability has ended subsequent to the rendition of the orig-
inal judgment. The only occasions on which a claimant might
seek a modification would be where he has received an award
for a specific loss and his condition has later changed so as to
render him totally disabled, or where, in cases of temporary
disability, the court has exercised its discretion to award com-
pensation for a fixed number of weeks based upon the judge's
estimate of the probable duration of the disability. 15 If, in the
latter instance, the worker's condition thereafter changes so that
he is faced with the prospect of total disability, he should be
allowed a modification in keeping with the intendment of R.S.
23:1331. It is noteworthy, however, that no modification can be
secured for six months after the rendition of the original judg-
ment.16 If, then, the original award was for a period of less than
six months, and the judgment has been fully paid when the time
comes when a modification is available, is the right to modifica-
tion lost? There would seem to be little reason why it should be.
The purpose of the statute is to insure that the employee will
be paid compensation during the full period of his disability' and
that the employer will not be required to pay for any longer
than this period of disability. The usual type of compensa-
tion judgment and the revisionary procedure provided by R.S.
23:1331 are both so designed to insure this result. The discre-
tion vested in the court to estimate the probable duration of
disability and fix an arbitrary number of weeks is given to the
15. LA. R.S. 23:1222 (1950).
16. Id. 23:1331.
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court for mere administrative convenience. It seems highly
doubtful to this writer that it was ever intended to empower
the court to so act in advance as to deprive the worker of his
usual privilege of seeking a modification whenever his condi-
tion has changed. Yet this was the conclusion reached by the
Supreme Court in Lacy v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance
Company of Wisconsin17 last term. The court expressed the
opinion that the statute envisions that the judgment for com-
pensation must be extant at the time the application for modifi-
cation is made. The court did not seem to be impressed by the
fact that the entire compensation scheme instigated by the leg-
islature even more strongly envisions that compensation pay-
ments shall be made during the entire period of disability so
long as the maximum period is not exceeded, and the statute
contemplates that necessary adjustments should be made after
judgment to that end. If a court-administered system is to ful-
fill successfully a function performed elsewhere through a com-
pensation commission with a continuing supervisory jurisdic-
tion, the statute must be so interpreted as to empower the court
to carry out the purpose of this statute. The act should not be so
interpreted as to defeat its obvious main purpose - compensa-
tion so long as the worker is disabled, but no longer.
EMPLOYER'S SUIT AGAINST THIRD PARTY TORTFEASORS
The exact nature of the claim of the employer against a third
person who has killed or injured the employee has arisen for
discussion several times in different contexts during the last
few years. An early decision, Foster & Glassell Co. v. Knight
Brothers,18 had characterized the employer's interest as a right
to indemnity for the amount paid the employee, against the tort-
feasor, who, as between himself and the employer, is the party
upon whom the responsibility should ultimately rest. More re-
cently the claim was described as one for a tort committed upon
the employer who was injured by being required to answer in
compensation for a damage inflicted wrongfully on his em-
ployee. 19 The matter of the nature of the employee's right is an
important one in connection with prescription, since tort claims
prescribe within one year from the time the damage is sustained,
while a claim for indemnity would arise only when the claim-
17. 233 La. 712, 98 So.2d 162 (1957).
18. 152 La. 596, 93 So. 913 (1922).
19. Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans v. New Orleans, 223 La.
199, 65 So.2d 313 (1953).
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ant's liability has become fixed. Last term in Marquette Cas-
ualty Co. v. Brown20 the Supreme Court made clear that the
employer's claim rests upon tort; hence his suit against a third
person was prescribed one year from the date of the accident,
although the employer had alleged that he did not know the ex-
tent of his compensation liability until some time after the acci-
dent, and that he filed his third party suit within a year from
this date of discovery.
In appraising this decision it is well to bear in mind that
under our compensation statute and recent decisions the em-
ployee's compensation claim may not prescribe until more than a
year has elapsed from the date of accident. Such a situation,
for example, would be presented whenever an apparently minor
injury later develops into a totally disabling ailment.21 Presum-
ably, however, the employee's tort claim against a third person
for the same injury would be governed by ordinary rules of pre-
scription. If the employee's own tort claim has expired by the
time he makes his compensation claim against his employer, it
seems fair that the employer should not be accorded a more ex-
tended period for proceeding against the third person by assert-
ing that a claimed right to indemnity could not accrue until the
employer was advised of the extent of his compensation liability.
The position adopted in the Brown decision appears to prevail
generally in other jurisdictions, although it has been criticized
on the ground that it may result in prescribing the employer's
claim before he is in a position to institute his third party suit.2
20. 235 La. 245, 103 So.2d 269 (1958).
21. Mottet v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 220 La. 653, 57 So.2d 218 (1952).
MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 384 (1955
Supplement).
22. 2 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 75.30 (1952).
